All Truth is Mere truth?

Merely Natural Rights

In a recent discussion with regard to natural law, a comment was made (it seemed to suggest, I think) that such appeals to a natural law are merely reformed (merely part of, any marginal group, for the sake of argument). It is difficult to grasp, given the context -  Thomas Aquinas in view, why the reference to the Reformed position at all. But I did think, at the time, it would be interesting... to some, to read this. 

“Fundamental to Rawls’s theory is the principle of equal respect for all members of the social order (or for all members who can engage in the relevant “bargaining”). The question is, what is the basis for this principle of equal respect? Dworkin’s conclusion is that “justice as fairness rests on the assumption of a natural right of all men and women to equality of concern and respect, a right they possess not by virtue of birth or characteristic or merit or excellence but simply as human beings with the capacity to make plans and give justice.”

Dworkin’s argument is almost entirely deductive: given other things Rawls says, this has to be his view. But there are passages in Theory of Justice that confirm Dworkin’s interpretation—though it has to be said that Rawls was evidently very reluctant to bring his appeal to inherent natural rights (and duties) to the surface, which is why most readers miss it. The most explicit passage in the main body of the text is this:

“Some writers have distinguished between equality as it is invoked in connection with the distribution of certain goods, some of which will almost certainly give higher status or prestige to those who are more favored, and equality as it applies to the respect which is owed to persons irrespective of their social position. Equality of the first kind is defined by the second principle of justice which regulates the structure of organizations and distributive shares so that social cooperation is both efficient and fair. But equality of the second kind is fundamental. It is defined by the first principle of justice and by such natural duties as that of mutual respect; it is owed to human beings as moral persons. The natural basis of equality explains its deeper significance’

…The most innovative feature of Rawls’s approach is that, rather than declaring a society to be just insofar as the inherent natural rights of its members are honored, and then giving an account of those rights, he claims to be able to develop a theory of social justice by appealing to just one such right, the right of rational moral agents to be treated with equal respect. In so doing he is assuming that principles of distribution that fully honor that right will secure the non-violation of every other inherent natural right. Whether this extraordinarily bold assumption is correct is the deepest issue in Rawlsian theory, though rarely discussed.” From Justice, RIGHTS AND WRONGS by Nicholas Wolterstorff

It seemed to me, to make reference to the Reformed tradition in this, merely sense, is a genetic fallacy of a sort. It suggests, as the Law Reform Commission does, on occasions, that the truth of a claim can be dismissed on face value (because it is Reformed). This even when, as is seen above, the claim forms part of a much bigger picture.